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The role of the channel coordinator and the structure of their supply chains are critical 
to the success of a supply chain that produces a product targeted at a specific market 
niche. Without the management of the channel coordinator, focussed on delivering a 
product with specific attributes to the target niche, the supply chain will be incapable 
of working in concert and creating a cohesive product offering. The supply chain 
structure is critical to this process. Although these two concepts are often mentioned 
in the supply chain and associated literature, and despite their importance, there is 
very little empirical evidence that shows the linkage between the channel coordinator 
and the supply chain structure. 
 
This paper is based on the analysis of five case studies of small firms that have 
created supply chains to market a meat product with specialised attributes to a target 
market niche. A framework is developed to determine the factors that will influence 
the strategy of a channel coordinator when managing their supply chain, and hence, 
the way they will structure the supply chain most effectively and profitably to reach 
the target market niche with the product attributes desired. 
 
Key words: Channel coordinator, supply chain structure, niche markets, New Zealand 
meat industry 
 
Introduction 
 
Many small organisations in New Zealand begin with an entrepreneur identifying a 
market niche that they feel they can serve more effectively than existing businesses.  
Such entrepreneurs are attracted to a specific niche, as they will often lack the 
resources necessary to compete in the generic market against large, established 
companies.  This is particularly apparent in international markets were New Zealand 
businesses are generally considered too small to compete.  Therefore, it is important 
to develop an understanding of how such businesses organise themselves to meet the 
needs of niche markets. 
 
The New Zealand meat industry is one of the country’s largest pastoral industries, so 
its success is important to the economy. In addition, there have been a lot of structural 
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 changes in the meat industry in recent years, with players entering and exiting the 
industry. As a result, businesses operating in niche markets in this industry will have 
been exposed to the pressures associated with this volatile environment, and will be 
seeking sustainable profitability in various ways. 
 
Entrepreneurs in the New Zealand meat industry who operate in specific market 
niches will conduct their operations as members of a wider supply chain, and will 
play a key role in these supply chains. While it is often argued that, to be successful, 
supply chains need to be tightly coordinated to meet the tight product specifications 
demanded by the modern agribusiness marketplace, de Moura (2002) found that this 
was not necessarily the case in domestic New Zealand meat chains. Although his 
study was largely focussed on commodity meat chains catering for the mass market, it 
also included a niche supply chain. This chain exhibited a structure that was markedly 
different to the structure of the other supply chains. However, it is not clear whether 
this niche structure could be indicative of niche chains in general, or whether it was 
unique to this particular chain. 
 
In order to successfully coordinate a supply chain, the role of the channel coordinator 
is clearly very important (Lambert and Cooper (2000).  In the case of niche chains, 
some (or all) of the organisations within these supply chains will be working in 
concert to target a specific market niche.  The need to develop a consistent product 
offering tailored to the demands of this market niche creates the need for centralised 
management of the supply chain, a role which would be undertaken by the channel 
coordinator.    
 
Despite the importance of the channel coordinator, there exists very little work on this 
role.  The channel coordinator is often mentioned in passing in the literature on 
supply chains and the concept is well known; yet it is difficult to find research that 
specifically focuses on the channel coordinator and their role.  The aim of this 
research is to gain a better understanding of the structure of niche supply chains in the 
New Zealand meat industry, and the role of the channel coordinator in creating and 
maintaining these structures. 
 
Literature 
 
The Role of the Channel Coordinator in Supply Chain Structure 
 
Relationship structures between the different levels of a supply chain can vary 
greatly.  They can be mapped on a continuum that extends from the spot market right 
through to vertical integration (Peterson & Wysocki, 1998).  In between, are varying 
levels of vertical coordination. Organisations will utilise the relationship structure that 
they perceive best suits their situation.  Trade-offs will exist between the increased 
efficiency of a closer relationship and the costs of creating and maintaining that 
relationship.  Therefore, when making decisions on what level of coordination will be 
most appropriate, organisations will consider what factors add value to the 
relationship (Lambert et al., 1996; Spekman et al., 1997).   
 
 Such relationship structuring will occur at each level of a supply chain.  A channel 
coordinator may be able to influence the structure of the relationships that make up a 
supply chain, and may do so in order to make the supply chain as efficient (lowest 
cost over the chain) and effective (meeting the demands of the targeted end 
consumer) as possible.     
 
Although there is a large amount of literature discussing the link between an 
individual organisation’s strategy and its structure (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith & 
Kazanjian, 1986; Galbraith & Nathanson, 1978; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1994; Miles & 
Snow, 1978, 1984), there appears to be very little relating to the supply chain as a 
whole. This is clearly a complex issue, since each individual firm in a supply chain 
will have its own strategy, but because the supply chain is made of a number of 
organisations, it is not an entity that has a ‘strategy’ in its own right. Instead, the 
strategy of the supply chain results from the alignment of the strategies of the 
organisations that make up the supply chain. The channel coordinator plays a key role 
in such alignment. Hence, any relationship between ‘strategy and structure’ within a 
supply chain must revolve around the strategy of the most influential organisation in 
the chain (which is the channel coordinator), how it aligns its strategy with those of 
the other organisations in the chain, and the supply chain structure. 
 
The channel coordinator (also known as the chain captain and the channel leader) 
integrates and manages the key business processes across members of the chain. As 
such, their role in the supply chain is crucial to the performance of the chain as a 
whole, as well as to the performance of the individual firms within the chain 
(Lambert & Cooper, 2000, p81); (Fitzpatrick & Burke, 2000)   
   
The channel coordinator will aim to coordinate the supply chain so that its essential 
functions are performed by the most appropriate organisation.  They can ensure that 
each organisation has a specific role in the supply chain (specialisation) and that all 
organisations within the chain share common strategic goals, thereby maintaining a 
supply chain focus (Bowersox & Closs, 1996). This chain coordination can remove 
non-value adding work, thereby maximising the efficiency of the whole supply chain 
(Bowersox et al., 2002).  
 
A number of factors can influence channel coordination and how centralised or 
decentralised it should be.  A major factor is obtaining and then sharing information 
that is scattered throughout the different units of a supply chain (Ertek & Griffin, 
2002), since information sharing is important to ensure a consistent approach to 
strategy across the chain. In order to achieve this chain alignment, the channel 
coordinator needs to effectively communicate their needs and expectations of the 
supply chain and to consistently match their own behaviour to their stated strategy.  
Landeros, Reck, & Plank (1995) discuss this point in relation to individual dyadic 
relationships, however, this concept can be clearly extended to the supply chain as a 
whole. 
 
Without some degree of centralised management, organisations within the supply 
chain may insist on maintaining those resources that strengthen their own 
independence within the system (Etgar, 1976).  There can also be less recognition of 
common goals as they attempt to enhance their own profitability, often to the 
 detriment of the supply chain as a whole.  Such fragmentation of  activities and 
decisions within the chain may reduce the efficiency of the system as a whole (Etgar, 
1976; Ouden et al., 1996), with the result that the supply chain does not achieve its 
full potential (Coughlan et al., 1996; Little, 1970). 
 
These arguments suggest that more centralised control of the chain is necessary to 
maintain the unity of the supply chain and the alignment of strategies of individual 
firms within the chain. However, it can also be argued that supply chains can be 
better managed when decisions are made closer to the point at which information is 
generated (Chandrashekar & Schary, 1999); that is, that some degree of 
decentralisation is appropriate. Resourcing issues might also dictate some degree of 
decentralisation of chain control. For example, the channel coordinator may choose to 
develop relationships with key vendors, who then take responsibility for complete 
subsystems or services, providing resources that the coordinator does not have or 
freeing up the coordinator’s resources (Peck & Juttner, 2000). 
 
It is clear that the channel coordinator is the organisation that has the most control 
over the supply chain. It exercises this control through its leadership, which then 
leads to a change in behaviour or perception by any other channel member towards a 
position or goal desired by the leader (Little, 1970). The channel coordinator can use 
one or more methods to achieve this: coercion, the use of incentives, and 
persuasiveness (which relates to the creation of a better understanding of common 
goals) (Little, 1970).   
 
From the above discussion, it is obvious that the role of a channel coordinator in a 
supply chain is very important for the efficient functioning of the chain.  However, 
very little empirical work has been done to validate its role in the supply chain. An 
accurate understanding of this role is made more complex by the fact that many 
chains can be quite disjointed, with more than one channel coordinator, each of whom 
controls separate parts of the chain. For niche chains in particular, the channel 
coordinator might not necessarily be the largest and/or most powerful organisation in 
the supply chain. An empirical study of the role of the chain coordinator, such as that 
reported in this paper, will help to bridge this gap in the literature. 
  
Environment and Resource Issues 
 
A key factor that will influence the channel coordinator’s strategy and supply chain 
structure is the environment surrounding the channel coordinator and the supply 
chain. Organisations adapt to their environment, and in addition, their relationships 
with other organisations will be influenced by both organisations’ interpretation of 
their environment and their perceptions of what their counterparts needs are (Pels et 
al., 2000). Hence, supply chain structures may evolve as a result of changing 
relationships between organisations in a chain, which in turn result from changes in 
their environment. 
 
This phenomenon has been noted in agribusiness industries in general, and is 
applicable to the meat industry. Many agribusiness industries are experiencing 
increasing levels of vertical coordination, which is thought to be influenced by 
 increasing demand for customised food products and food safety.  For example, 
changing consumer demand is forcing agribusiness firms away from products that are 
traded in more traditional commodity based spot markets. They are moving to more 
specialised, low-volume products whose end-use has been determined prior to 
harvesting or sale. (Sporleder, 1992, p1226). This is thought to lead to greater vertical 
coordination, although de Moura (2002) found that this is not necessarily always the 
case.  
 
While the environment will influence the channel coordinator’s strategy, and 
ultimately, the supply chain structure, resource issues will also have a key impact. 
Resources are used by a supply chain to develop a product offering, and are to be 
found both within the channel coordinator’s organisation and within organisations in 
the wider supply chain.  Because of their key role in the chain, the channel 
coordinator will have a degree of influence over the resources used in a supply chain 
and the way in which they are employed. Because of their varying importance, 
accessibility and the level of control the channel coordinator can exert over them, 
these chain resources will have an impact on the channel coordinator’s strategy. 
 
There are a number of viewpoints on the interrelationships between resources, firm 
strategy, relationship structures and supply chain structures. In this study, four 
approaches are reviewed: Porter’s approach, the Resource Based View (RBV) of the 
firm, the Resource Dependency Approach (RDA) and the Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) view. The SCM view has been briefly touched on in the previous section with 
the discussion on the role of the channel coordinator in supply chain structure. 
 
Porter (1985) asserts that the strategy of any organisation will be to use its resources 
to create a competitive advantage for itself; that is, to gain an advantage over a 
competitor or group of competitors. In the case of niche markets, a firm focusing on 
one consumer segment can create competitive advantage by using its resources to 
better tailor its product to its target consumer needs. This differentiates it from 
mainstream products, and in some cases, may also decrease its costs (Porter, 1985). 
Moving from the firm to the wider chain, Porter further argues that competitive 
advantage is not only created within organisations, but also in the links between 
organisations in a supply chain.  Such linkages foster coordination and can lead to 
optimisation within the supply chain – in terms of cost, inventory and speed of 
moving product through the supply chain – thereby improving the position of firms 
within the chain (Porter, 1985).   
 
While insightful, other authors have argued that Porter does not fully explain why a 
diverse and ever-changing assortment of firms can coexist (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). 
The Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm claims to address this shortcoming, by 
attempting to explain the diversity of organisations in a market.  Under this 
framework, every organisation is viewed as having a different assortment of resources 
that will, in turn, influence its strategy as it tries to match these resources to the best 
fitting market segment (Hunt & Morgan, 1995; Peteraf, 1993).   
 
The RBV argues that, for an organisation to create competitive advantage, it needs to 
match its resources to its environment.  For this competitive advantage to be 
sustainable, the results of this matching must be conducted in a superior manner to 
 other organisations and must be difficult for other organisations to replicate within an 
acceptable timeframe or cost (Madhok, 2002). Resources can include not only 
tangible resources, such as land and capital, but also intangibles such as 
organisational culture, knowledge, and competencies (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). 
 
This creation and successful use of resources that help an organisation to gain 
sustained competitive advantage can be viewed as an ongoing process.  Organisations 
and their markets are in a constant state of disequilibrium as they attempt to neutralise 
and/or surpass the competitive advantage of other organisations (Hunt & Morgan, 
1995).  Hence, the value of resources are continually eroded as competitors find ways 
to imitate these sources of competitive advantage (Markides & Williamson, 1996).  
 
Thus, resources can be viewed as having different economic lifecycles, and as a 
result, an organisation’s resources will be continually bundled, unbundled, and 
rebundled, in order to deliver an ongoing stream of revenue from several sources of 
competitive advantage (Black & Boal, 1994).  Therefore, for an organisation to 
maintain its competitive position, it must not only reduce the likelihood of 
competitors appropriating these resources (Black & Boal, 1994), but it must also have 
accumulated competences that allow it to build new strategic assets more rapidly and 
efficiently than these competitors (Markides & Williamson, 1996). 
 
The RBV focuses on an organisation’s own resources and how these can be the 
source of its competitive advantage. However, organisations are generally unable to 
internalise all the resources that they need.  Therefore, they are motivated to interact 
with other organisations to gain access to resources external to their organisation.  
The interaction of these organisations results in them becoming part of a supply 
chain.  The nature of these inter-firm interactions forms the basis for the Resource 
Dependency Approach (RDA).  
 
The RDA has a different emphasis on an organisation’s resources to that of the RBV, 
although the two approaches are complementary.  Under the RDA, an organisation’s 
survival is dependent on its ability to acquire and maintain resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  However, since organisations are unlikely to control all of the 
resources that they need, they gain and maintain needed external resources by altering 
their structure and patterns of behaviour (Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  In other words, 
they purchase resources or work with other organisations that already control the 
needed resources. 
 
The magnitude of an organisation’s dependency on a resource is affected by its 
relative portion of an organisation’s inputs, how critical the resource is to the 
organisation’s production, the availability of the resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
and the amount of control that the organisation’s suppliers have over the resource 
relative to the organisation (Sporleder, 1992).  The RDA can be viewed as a risk 
management approach (Sporleder, 1992), as organisations make decisions about their 
boundaries; in other words, whether a resource is so valuable to the organisation that 
it needs to be controlled within it (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Rasheed & Geiger, 
2001). 
 
 To ensure their survival, organisations will aim to decrease their dependence on other 
organisations, while increasing other organisations’ dependence on them (Smeltzer & 
Sifred, 1998; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  The more critical a resource is to an 
organisation, the stronger the need for that organisation to control the resource instead 
of having other organisations control it (Smeltzer & Sifred, 1998).  Organisations can 
use one or a combination of approaches to maintain control. These are vertical 
integration (if they wish to control the resource themselves), horizontal integration 
(which can make an organisation more powerful and allow it to exert leverage over its 
trading partners), and diversification (if it wishes to reduce its reliance on a specific 
resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
 
These different viewpoints on the role of resources can lead to different perspectives 
on relationships within chains. For example, the RDA approach to relationships 
appears to conflict with some of the prescriptions from the Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) approach, which was discussed briefly in the previous section. 
In the SCM approach, decreasing the number of suppliers is viewed as a method of 
streamlining a chain and making it more efficient. This is likely to be viewed 
unfavourably by the RDA, since it would increase the likelihood of an interruption of 
supply.  
 
Likewise, a SCM approach would favour non-core functions being managed by other 
specialist organisations that can perform these function more efficiently, with strong 
relationships being formed to ensure that both organisations benefit from this 
increased efficiency, and to minimise ‘loss of control’. Hence, organisations focus on 
joint value creation, eliminating the need to expend energy gaining power in the 
supply chain. On the other hand, the RDA would view such outsourcing to other 
organisations as increasing an organisation’s dependence on other organisations 
(Smeltzer & Sifred, 1998). 
 
From the RDA perspective, relationships can be viewed as a strategy to gain access to 
the resources of other organisations, and with the appropriate relationship structure, 
new sources of competitive advantage can be created for both organisations.  The aim 
of organisations in these relationships is usually to either obtain the other 
organisation’s resources, or to retain and develop the organisation’s own resources by 
combining them with the other organisation’s resources.  This can be achieved either 
through ownership or vertical coordination (Das & Teng, 2000). 
 
When organisations reach a certain level of vertical coordination they become more 
than independent entities who transact together.  The relationship between them can 
become a strategic asset as the resources of each organisation complements the other 
(Madhok, 2002), creating a competitive advantage for them both.  The various views 
on the impact of the environment and resources in influencing strategy and 
relationship structures all offer valuable insights into how chains might structure 
themselves and the role of the channel coordinator in this process. In the following 
section, the literature is drawn together in the form of a framework that then forms the 
basis for the empirical investigation. 
 
 Framework and Methodology 
 
Framework 
 
In this section, a framework is presented, which argues that the structure of a supply 
chain is influenced by the channel coordinator’s strategy, which is, in turn, influenced 
by the channel coordinator’s motivation and vision, developed as a result of 
environmental and resource issues (Figure 1).  Each part of this framework and the 
interactions between them will now be discussed. 
 
T
The channel coordinator (box 2) is the link between the environment (box 1), 
resource issues (box 3), and the supply chain structure (box 4).  Through their 
motivation and vision (box 2a), the channel coordinator identifies a target market in 
the environment whose needs can be met by combining internal resources (those 
directly controlled by the channel coordinator) and external resources (those not 
directly controlled by the channel coordinator) in a suitable manner, and create a 
product offering that meets the demands of the environment.   
 
The channel coordinator then creates a strategy (box 2b), which in turn, will dictate 
how they organise the supply chain (Supply Chain Structure, box 4) in a manner that 
meets the needs of the target market as efficiently and effectively as possible (arrow 
E) within the boundaries set by the environment and resource issues.  The supply 
chain structure includes all of the organisations involved in the supply chain, and the 
relationships and coordination structures between each of them.   
 
The channel coordinator’s motivation (box 2a) refers to the motivation for being the 
channel coordinator of the supply chain.  This may be created by the channel 
coordinator having a vision (box 2a), which is, in its turn, a result of a combination of 
both an opportunity that the channel coordinator has identified in the environment 
(box 1) and their ability to make profitable use of the organisation’s resources (box 
3).   
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Strategy 
Figure 1 - Framework  based on the Literature 
 The Environment (box 1) refers to the environment that the channel coordinator is 
operating in and includes several factors.  This model depicts a one-way flow of 
influence from the Environment to the Channel Coordinator (arrow A).  This is 
because, in a niche market, the channel coordinator is thought to have very little 
influence over his environment as the impact of methods such as advertising and 
lobbying government will be limited.  That is, the channel coordinator can be 
described as a servant to the market as most of the influence and information flows 
from the environment to the channel coordinator. 
 
Resource Issues (box 3) encompasses the resources both controlled by the channel 
coordinator and resources that are controlled by other organisations.  There is a two-
way flow between the channel coordinator and the resource issues (arrows B and C) 
due to an ongoing process of feedback and adaptation.  The process begins with the 
channel coordinator determining which resources are needed to fulfil the demands of 
the environment.  There are various methods that the channel coordinator can employ 
to gain access to resources not under their control that are needed to meet the needs of 
the target market (arrow B).  This will be a mix of internal resources controlled by the 
channel coordinator and external resources that the channel coordinator will need to 
acquire (arrow C).  Once access to the needed resources has been established (arrow 
B), the channel coordinator will create a strategy (box 2b) in order to achieve his 
vision (arrow D).  As the environment changes (box 1), the channel coordinator will 
adapt, changing what resources are needed (arrow C). 
 
The channel coordinator’s strategy for meeting the needs of the target market(s) with 
the resources employed by the supply chain (while also ensuring stability of access to 
those resources) (box 2b) will influence the supply chain structure (box 4). A key 
decision faced by the channel coordinator in this regard is the make or buy decision; 
that is, should a particular step in the value added process be made in-house by the 
channel coordinator or purchased from another firm, and if purchased from another 
firm, then how should relationships with them be structured? The resulting supply 
chain structure could be a mix of vertical integration, vertical coordination and spot 
markets, depending on the importance and availability of each resource to the channel 
coordinator.   
 
This process whereby the channel coordinator’s strategy influences chain structure is 
shown by a one-way arrow in the diagram (arrow E).  Although the existing supply 
chain structure will have some influence over the strategy of the channel coordinator, 
it is argued that this structure is more a result of the channel coordinator’s strategy 
rather than the other way round.  The channel coordinator may modify their strategy 
to a certain extent to get the existing supply chain structure to meet the needs of the 
market based on a cost/benefit analysis of each modification.  However, it is probably 
the demands of the market and how this influences the channel coordinator’s strategy 
that leads to adaptations in the supply chain structure, not vice versa. 
 
The process depicted in the model is a dynamic one, with the channel coordinator 
constantly receiving data from its target market.  A known characteristic of niche 
markets is that they can change their makeup and preferences very rapidly.  Therefore 
this information may need to be continually monitored by the channel coordinator, 
 and the bundle of benefits offered by the supply chain adapted to match these 
changes. 
 
This makes the cycle between the channel coordinator’s vision and strategy and the 
resource issues a continual process as the channel coordinator assesses what resources 
are needed to continue to meet the demands of the changing target market and the 
environment in general.  Thus it is argued that the channel coordinator’s motivation 
and vision will be continually influenced by the changing dynamics of the 
environment, which will probably create the need for ongoing evolution of the 
channel coordinator’s strategy and therefore, supply chain structure.  Resources may 
be constantly bundled, unbundled and rebundled to create the most competitive 
offering for the target market.  This whole process is an ongoing exercise in order for 
the supply chain to stay one step ahead of competitors and meet the continually 
changing needs of the target market. 
 
Methodology 
 
The framework discussed above was operationalised using Yin’s case study method 
(Yin, 1984), which is a qualitative methodology. As dictated by the method, a number 
of propositions were developed to guide the empirical enquiry. These emerged from 
the framework and were: 
 
Proposition one: 
The channel coordinator will have a vision for the supply chain and the target niche 
market, and; 
The channel coordinator will have a range of motivating factors for becoming the 
channel coordinator; 
 
Proposition two: 
The channel coordinator will have a strategy for the supply chain that matches the 
resources of the chain with the target niche market, which fulfils his vision; 
 
Proposition three: 
The nature of niche agribusiness environments affects the vision and motivation, as 
well as the strategy, of the channel coordinator; 
 
Proposition four: 
Resource issues affect the motivation and vision, as well as the strategy, of the 
channel coordinator; 
 
Proposition five: 
The strategy of the channel coordinator influences the structure of its niche 
agribusiness supply chain. 
 
Since the focus of the research was on the supply chain, and the role of the channel 
coordinator in the supply chain, the unit of analysis was the supply chain. However, 
the focus of the empirical work was on the channel coordinator within the supply 
chain and it was their perspective that was captured. The size of the sample (number 
 of case studies) was dictated by the principle of saturation. This resulted in five 
supply chains being investigated (Mason, 1997).   
 
The information for each case study came primarily from focussed in-depth 
interviews with the channel coordinator of each supply chain.  Additional information 
was gathered from a follow up conversation by telephone with the channel 
coordinator, as well as written information produced by the channel coordinators and 
third parties. 
 
A pilot case study was conducted to refine the questioning technique, and further case 
studies were chosen to ensure that both literal and theoretical replication occurred 
(Yin, 1984). Interviews covered channel coordinators of niche supply chains who 
were functioning at different levels in their respective chains – two farmers, one meat 
processor, one distributor and one manufacturer (these descriptions are based on the 
main function they performed in their respective supply chains). 
 
The case studies were analysed using standard techniques of qualitative analysis.  The 
most distinctive features of each case study is briefly described and then cross-case 
analysis is used to compare and contrast the different factors that may have some 
influence on supply chain structure.   
 
Results and Analysis 
 
In this Section, the most distinctive features of each chain are briefly discussed. This 
is then followed by a discussion of the results of the cross case comparisons that were 
undertaken. 
 
Case Study Features 
 
Case 1 is based on a supply chain coordinated by the farmer to sell pig meat of a 
consistently high quality at a premium price in the New Zealand market.  The pigs are 
raised only on the farmer’s piggery and the meat is sold through premium butchers, 
both directly to consumers and to restaurants.  The most noticeable feature of this 
supply chain is the decentralisation of control.  The channel coordinator in case 1 has 
gained competitive advantage by creating a supply chain that is difficult to replicate, 
and is based on strong relationship structures with the organisations critical to the 
supply chain.  In particular, the wholesaler and some of the main butchers involved in 
the supply chain have a strong commitment to the success of the supply chain.  The 
wholesaler also manages part of the supply chain, creating decentralisation of control, 
thereby reducing resource expenditure by the channel coordinator.  In other words, 
the channel coordinator relies on and trusts other organisations to autonomously 
perform critical functions in the supply chain.  This is important, as it would not be 
difficult for a motivated organisation to imitate the product produced by this supply 
chain. 
 
Case 2 is based on a supply chain coordinated by an exporting company owned by 
two partners.  One of the partners is also the farmer through which all of the lambs for 
 the supply chain are finished on.  The lamb is sold to a wholesaler in the U.S., 
although the channel coordinator has been developing relationships directly with 
supermarkets not already supplied by the wholesaler.  The most noticeable feature of 
this chain is its immaturity, which seems to have influenced its supply chain structure. 
In this case, the channel coordinator has used other actors to perform critical 
functions due to its own lack of knowledge and resources.  They invest a lot of 
resources into communication and monitoring these other actors in the supply chain 
to overcome the limitations of this approach, and they interact personally with every 
organisation in the supply chain.  This ensures that although they do not have the 
resource base to vertically integrate any functions, they tightly control all critical 
functions. 
 
Case 3 is based on a supply chain coordinated by an exporting company that sells 
consistently high quality cuts of lamb to supermarkets in the United States.  The most 
noticeable feature of the supply chain in case 3 is the channel coordinator’s 
ownership of the distribution function to its retail customers in the United States.  The 
channel coordinator felt that internalising this function gives them competitive 
advantage through the greater control they have over their supply chain and the 
knowledge that they have built up performing this function.  As part of this process, 
they have created very strong relationships with the main supermarket chains they 
focused on supplying.  The channel coordinator has not vertically integrated any 
functions in New Zealand, but does have a strong relationship structure with the meat 
processor, as this actor’s function is considered critical to the success of the supply 
chain.  
 
Case 4 is based on a supply chain managed by an exporting company, who also acts 
as the primary meat processor.  The channel coordinator sells a mix of certified 
natural and organic beef to supermarkets in the United States.  The channel 
coordinator stated that they preferred to be low cost rather than to invest in 
infrastructure.  To facilitate this, they have a strong relationship with the main 
supermarket chains they supply. They utilise the services of a wholesaler to deliver 
their product to these supermarkets and to consolidate their billing.  They also use a 
leasing arrangement with the meat processor, allowing it to use its own butchers 
without the need to invest in infrastructure.  The channel coordinator states that 
creating mutually beneficial relationships, rather than using vertical integration, 
simplifies their processes while still allowing them to retain control of their product 
and  brand over the length of the supply chain. 
 
Case 5 is based on a supply chain managed by the manufacturer.  The manufacturer 
produces high quality meat products made from lamb, beef or chicken.  The product 
is sold to supermarkets in New Zealand.  This supply chain is very different to the 
other four chains.  The channel coordinator controls the manufacturing process, 
purchasing meat with specific product attributes from the spot market, which they 
then process using their own patented technology.  From this, they produce a 
consistently high quality, processed product.  This makes the supply chain very short 
in comparison to those of the other four cases.  As a result, the channel coordinator 
does not feel the need to control or closely monitor the performance of any other part 
of the supply chain.   
 
 It can be observed that there are quite striking differences in the supply chain 
structures of the case studies.  However, there are also many common features of each 
supply chain. These similarities and differences are now discussed. 
 
 
Cross Case Comparisons 
 
As predicted by the framework, differences in the environment (such as the specific 
product attributes demanded by the target market) and differences in resource issues 
(such as the extent of the financial resources available to the channel coordinator) 
influenced the strategies employed by the channel coordinators. These different 
strategies, in their turn, resulted in differing supply chain structures and relationships, 
which were based on differing levels of communication, trust, profit and risk sharing 
and partner autonomy.  For example, in case 1 the channel coordinator has a strategy 
of using other organisations to monitor and manage functions critical to the success of 
the supply chain (decentralisation of control). Therefore, even though it maintains 
good communication with other chain actors, it has little need to expend its own 
limited resources, as other organisations are able to undertake critical functions.  In 
case 2, on the other hand, part of the channel coordinator’s strategy is to personally 
communicate with, and coordinate, every actor in the supply chain and closely to 
monitor as many functions as they are able. 
 
The environment was shown to have a key influence on the vision and motivation of 
a channel coordinator; for example, in case 1 the channel coordinator created the 
supply chain following his discovery that few high quality restaurants offered pork on 
the menu due the lack of consistently high quality product.  There was also evidence 
that the environment of the channel coordinator can have some influence on their 
strategy. For example, in case 4, the channel coordinator switched from sourcing 
steers to bull beef when it was discovered that consumers actually preferred a higher 
fat content in the product to improve its flavour, even though they had stated the 
contrary during market research.  Product characteristics can also play a role in 
strategy; for example, the channel coordinator in case 1 went to great lengths not to 
stress their pigs before slaughter to maintain their pH at an optimum level for their 
high quality niche market.  All channel coordinators faced challenges in managing the 
perishability of meat and the associated government regulations.   
 
Resource issues were shown to have a very strong influence on the strategy of 
channel coordinators, and ultimately, on the supply chain structure.  In all of the 
cases, the channel coordinator’s strategy overcame his lack of knowledge in certain 
areas by partnering with an actor knowledgeable in that area.  Examples include the 
partnering of the channel coordinator with the wholesaler in cases 1 and 2, with the 
customs broker in cases 3 and 4, and with the merchandising company in case 5.  
Such partnering appears to be particularly important when supply chains are in their 
development phase, but may continue into the maturity phase.  For example, some  
channel coordinators admitted that they could now perform functions that another 
actor performs because they had accumulated the necessary knowledge over time to 
do so. Despite this, they chose to maintain their relationship with their partner, as this 
 simplified their processes. Examples of this are the relationship between the channel 
coordinator and the import broker in cases 3 and 4. 
 
All of the channel coordinators ensured that they controlled the functions in the 
supply chain that were necessary to retain control of their brand and to maintain the 
consistency of the product marketed under it.  That is, they ensured that they had 
control of those resources that acted as sources of competitive advantage for them.  
Their control of these key functions came either directly (through ownership of the 
function) or indirectly (through a relationship with another actor). For example, in 
case 3 the channel coordinator owns the distribution function in the United States as 
he sees this as critical to the success of his supply chain, while in case four the 
channel coordinator works closely with a U.S. distributor while retaining control of 
the product through to the supermarkets.  Controlling key functions through 
relationships didn’t necessarily signify that the channel coordinator lacked the 
resources to perform this function themselves. As noted above, the channel 
coordinators in cases 3 and 4 chose to have another party perform a key function 
despite having been able to acquire the resources to do so themselves. It is interesting 
to note that the key functions that channel coordinators sought to control occurred at 
different points in the chain, which reflected those parts of the chain where their 
competitive advantage lay.  For example, the channel coordinator in case 3 owns the 
U.S. distribution function, while in case 4 the channel coordinator is responsible for 
the majority of the meat processing function. 
 
All channel coordinators used incentives to motivate the other actors in the supply 
chain to perform their required functions; usually in the form of a profit incentive.  
For example, in case 2 the channel coordinator supplies the U.S. distributor (who is 
also a meat processor) with product, which fills the gap created by the shortfall in 
American produced lamb, while also taking a percentage of the profits.  In some cases 
this has gone a step further, with the channel coordinator employing a strategy 
utilising persuasiveness to motivate some actors by creating reciprocal dependency 
with them.  This can be observed in case 1 where the channel coordinator has made it 
more profitable for the wholesaler to sell the channel coordinator’s branded product 
in place of his own branded product to customers, both new and existing.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to gain a better understanding of the structure of niche 
supply chains in the New Zealand meat industry, and the role of the channel 
coordinator in creating and maintaining these structures. Although it is widely 
acknowledged that the channel coordinator is a critical player in supply chains, there 
is very little literature on the role of this organisation. 
 
A framework was devised that linked the channel coordinator to supply chain 
structure. This framework suggests that the channel coordinator is motivated to scan 
the environment to identify a niche market opportunity. Its vision emerges from this 
process and it then formulates a strategy for delivering the requirements of this 
market niche. In doing so, it must utilise both its own internal resources, and also the 
 external resources of other chain participants. In doing so, it creates a supply chain 
structure that can match these resources to the demands of the market. 
 
This reasoning was supported by the empirical investigation of five niche chains in 
the New Zealand meat industry. This found that the environment had a key influence 
on the motivation and vision of the channel coordinator, while resource issues had a 
strong influence on the strategy used to achieve this vision. When a channel 
coordinator lacked resources, they partnered with other organisations to gain access to 
required resources. However, they ensured that they retained strong control of those 
functions and resources that ere sources of competitive advantage to them. They did 
this through ownership of those functions and resources or by building very strong 
relationships with other organisations in the chain. They used incentives to motivate 
these organisations, usually in the form of a profit incentive. 
 
This research has enhanced understanding of the structure of supply chains by its 
focus on the channel coordinator.  In particular, it has drawn a clear link between the 
role that the channel coordinator plays in matching the needs of the market with the 
resources available to the chain to meet those needs, and the consequences of this for 
chain structure.  This research has been particularly useful to small firms targeting 
market niches, as it has developed an understanding of how some firms have 
overcome their resource limitations to work with larger firms and create a product 
offering customised for a specific market niche. 
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